



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The immortality of man

THE IMMORTALITY OF MAN

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The Ingersoll Lecture, 1926



THE IMMORTALITY OF MAN

ACCORDING TO THE VIEWS OF THE MEN
OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

BY

✓
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THE INGERSOLL LECTURESHIP

Extract from the will of Miss Caroline Haskell Ingersoll, who died in Keene, County of Cheshire, New Hampshire, Jan. 26, 1893

First. In carrying out the wishes of my late beloved father, George Goldthwait Ingersoll, as declared by him in his last will and testament, I give and bequeath to Harvard University in Cambridge, Mass., where my late father was graduated, and which he always held in love and honor, the sum of Five thousand dollars (\$5,000) as a fund for the establishment of a Lectureship on a plan somewhat similar to that of the Dudleian lecture, that is — one lecture to be delivered each year, on any convenient day between the last day of May and the first day of December, on this subject, “the Immortality of Man,” said lecture not to form a part of the usual college course, nor to be delivered by any Professor or Tutor as part of his usual routine of instruction, though any such Professor or Tutor may be appointed to such service. The choice of said lecturer is not to be limited to any one religious denomination, nor to any one profession, but may be that of either clergyman or layman, the appointment to take place at least six months before the delivery of said lecture. . . . The same lecture to be named and known as “the Ingersoll lecture on the Immortality of Man.”

THE IMMORTALITY OF MAN

I WONDER if it has ever struck you that so little is said about immortality in the New Testament. Strictly speaking, there is but one passage — a famous passage and often commented upon — in which the problem is alluded to. I refer to I Corinthians 15: 53-54: "For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality. So when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory."

I said just now, the problem of immortality, for it is with immortality as a problem that we are concerned. The

New Testament is a book of revelation, and in the domain of revelation problems are unknown. Nevertheless, we do now and then discuss immortality, as this Ingersoll lectureship bears witness. It is evident that the disposition to argue, to make a problem out of immortality, has nothing to do with revelation. It has its origin in our reasoning powers. We come upon it whenever we find Christianity seeking for some common ground with philosophy. Viewed in this light the problem of immortality, and more especially the problem of the immortality of the soul, is a philosophical or, perhaps, a theological problem. In all probability it was this already with St. Paul, whose rabbinical mind led him to indulge in dialectical intricacies. This first becomes apparent, however, with the men of the second and third centuries whom we are accustomed to call distinctively the Apolo-

gists. Their work, as regards both its method and its results, still remains typical of Christian apologetics, even down to the present day. Call to mind Justin, philosopher and martyr, with Tatian, Athenagoras, Lactantius, and many others.

In the introduction to his "Dialogue with Trypho the Jew," Justin vividly describes how, before he became a Christian, he was haunted by the problem of the soul almost as much as by the problem of God. He tells us how he debated it with the philosophers, hurrying from one school to another, until he became convinced that none of them knew anything of what the soul is, much less what is to become of it after death. It is to be noted how he tries to free the problem from its rationalistic associations and to bring it within the domain of religion. He says, "The soul partakes of life, not because of any in-

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nate quality or any merit of its own, but through the will of God, which may also deprive the soul of life, that is, of God's spirit, if God so please."

As to the body, Christians of that time agreed in believing that the flesh, which decays with time and of necessity must fall to dust, will be resuscitated by the power of God in a state of incorruptibility. The Christian apologists, as, for example, Athenagoras, who has dealt with the subject in a special treatise, did indeed bring forward rationalistic arguments for such a resurrection of the body. In the main, however, it was with them not a question to be discussed; it was a matter of faith, and as such was fixed in the Creed. The article in the Creed touching the resurrection of the body, when taken in its true sense, does not admit of being explained away. It is not too much to say that the hope of resurrection of the

fleshly body — *αὐτὴ ἡ σὰρξ* — was the strongest support of religious morality with these Christians. This article shows also most clearly the contrast between the apologists and their rationalistic opponents. The thought that this decaying flesh, once dissolved, should again become alive was for Celsus unbearable. To oppose it was a point of duty with him. Yet, far from being a materialist, it is by his very idealism that he is drawn to combat so dreadful a notion. On the other hand, that the soul, this portion of the all-pervading spirit of God, cannot pass away but will live to all eternity, was for Celsus, as indeed for all Platonists, an accepted tenet.

It is not within the scope of my subject to go into details as to the older Christian apologetic. For the sake, however, of what I have later to say, I must urge one point as of special in-

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terest, namely, the differing tendencies in apologetic thought with regard to our problem. Some of the apologists proceed on purely rationalistic grounds. For this mode of argument, Lactantius is typical. He always takes the side of the idealistic philosophers, whom he calls to witness, from Plato to Cicero, having recourse even to heathen oracles, especially the Sibylline, but never making use of Christian tradition or touching the religious need. Then there are those who, like Justin, try to plant rationalistic arguments upon religious soil, justifying secondarily by reason that which they hold primarily by faith. "The soul," so Tatian declares, in a fine passage of his "Oratio," "is not immortal in itself. It can and will gain immortality, although temporarily separated from the body, if only it is permeated by the knowledge of God. Otherwise, it must die, to be resuscitated

with the body at the end of the world for eternal punishment." Of these Christian philosophers as a whole, we may say that they profess a rational faith based on the belief in God, the Creator of heaven and earth, and in freedom, with virtue as its result and as the means of approach to God, and in immortality as the reward of virtue. This is what we are wont to call the triad of rational faith — God, Freedom, and Immortality. Not all of the apologists, however, adopted the rational arguments. To Origen and the Christian neoplatonists, Platonic realism was the means of spiritualizing the rather crude eschatological hopes of the mass of believers.

During the centuries which followed, our problem seems to have been almost entirely neglected. There is but slight trace of its discussion. The little treatise on the "Immortality of the Soul"

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which St. Augustine composed during the winter after his conversion is scarcely more than a record of discussions which he had held in private circles with his friends. It is interesting on this account, but not of great value in itself.

When, in the twelfth century, the writings of the Arabian commentators on Aristotelian philosophy came to be translated into Latin, the question was raised anew. I cannot here dwell upon the enormous influence exerted upon the mind of Europe by the recovery of a knowledge of Aristotle. I should however recall the fact that the metaphysic of Aristotle came to the learned, at first, in the adulterated form which it had assumed in passing through the minds of such men as Avicenna and Averroes. Among other things, the manner in which they dealt with the problem of the soul, and especially with the problem of the immortality of the soul,

frightened the Church and the leading schoolmen. According to Averroes, our individual existence in soul and body is strictly limited to our earthly life and ends with death. Eternity is to be ascribed only to that single spirit which pervades the universe as an emanation from the godhead. When this theory was defended in public at the University of Paris by Siger of Brabant, the Church sought with all its might to quench the fire of this heresy. But the growing tendency to skepticism, furthered by the spread and final victory of nominalism, served rather to fan the flame, save, indeed, when the skeptics chose to mask their heresy by an appeal to the decision of the Church.

The best instance of this dubious attitude is that of Pietro Pomponazzi, an eminent philosopher of the time of the Renaissance. His treatise on the "Immortality of the Soul," which gave rise

to much debate, is based on the principle laid down by William of Occam: *Utraque pars potest teneri et neutra sufficienter probari*. That is to say, "Both sides of a question may be maintained but neither can be sufficiently proved." To one who reads with open eyes this treatise of Pomponazzi it is evident that the author sides with the Averroists in denying the immortality of the soul. Yet as an Averroist, following the theory of "double truth," he could say that that which is true under the philosophical aspect need not be also a theological truth. In fact, at the end of the treatise we find this remarkable limitation, *semper tamen et in hoc et in aliis subjiciendo sedi Apostolicae*, — "always submitting what I have to say to the verdict of the Apostolic See." Incidentally, the See condemned Pomponazzi's views. The Lateran Council, having in 1513 asserted the immortality of the soul and

the individuality of the soul of each person, and having pronounced heretical any assertion to the contrary, Pomponazzi was ordered to recant his thesis.

Meantime, in the period of the Renaissance, Aristotelianism lost ground while Platonism advanced at a rapid pace. With regard to our subject, this meant the revival of those diversities of opinion to which I referred when speaking of the apologists. Indeed the members of the so-called Academy at Florence, which was founded and sustained by the Medici, men like Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, are in more than one respect to be compared with the early apologists. Ficino thought himself a good Christian when he wrote his "*Theologia Platonica de Immortalitate Animarum*." So also did Pico in expounding his neoplatonic view on the destiny of man to become god. This same neoplatonic instinct, a century

later, led outspoken pantheists like Giordano Bruno to adhere to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Yet Ficino and Bruno are men of quite different types. However closely Bruno, who died in the year 1600, is related to the humanists of the Renaissance, he is something more than that. He is the forerunner of the Enlightenment, that spiritual movement of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries whose pioneers sought to give to mankind a new spiritual support, afforded by the natural sciences and philosophy, and to free men from the fetters of Church and of dogma, as well as from the prejudices of past ages. With Bruno, Copernicanism comes for the first time into our view. The great discovery of the Canon of Frauenburg had been Bruno's inspiration, and his heroic enthusiasm made him a propagandist on its behalf. He reproduced in glowing imagination what

was but sober observation on the part of the scientist. It is by no means a mere coincidence, but characteristic of the man, that Bruno, upon invitation of the University of Oxford, lectured both "*De Quintuplici Sphaera*" and on *The Immortality of the Soul*. His imaginative spirit could not endure the thought that anything in the universe should be lost. He thought of everything as changing and being transformed into something else. Body and soul are equally immortal. The body dissolves and returns to its elements. The soul transmigrates and, drawing to itself atom after atom, reconstructs for itself a new body. The spirit that animates and moves all things is one. Its different manifestations are due to the different forms and bodies in which it operates. There is, therefore, no need of individual immortality, as there is no need of reward and punishment in the future life.

It is obvious that traditional views of our fate after death must have been vitally changed wherever the facts of natural science and the principles of modern philosophy, with the complete revolution thus occasioned in our ideas of the universe, have been given earnest consideration. Yet, as a matter of fact, the Christian ideas of a localized heaven and hell, based upon the primitive topography of the universe current in ancient and mediaeval times, proved to be much more tenacious of life than might have been expected. Only reluctantly have they given way to Copernican astronomy. The mass of men, even to the present day, recoil from the consequences. On the other hand, some of the reformers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were far in advance of the masses, though it may be doubted whether, strictly speaking, they were Copernicans. They were the

first to break with the notion that heaven and hell are eschatological in the true sense of the word. They showed them to be present realities, tendencies of life, "ways of reacting toward the things of deepest import." In this respect, as in many others, they even suggest to us the champions of natural religion among their contemporaries. For instance, with Lord Herbert of Cherbury, of the five *notitiae communes circa religionem* which he makes the basis of true religion, the fifth is, *esse praemium vel poenam post hanc vitam*. He says that this thesis is asserted openly by every religion, law, or philosophy, and what is more, by conscience itself. These all not merely teach the immortality of the soul, but speak of God as avenging crimes which have escaped punishment in this life. In his opinion there is no race, however barbarous, which does not acknowledge

these categories of reward and punishment. As to the immortality of the soul, he does not go so far as to draw argument for it from the worship of the dead, which has been practised from remotest ages, nor to cling to superstitions and ceremonies as evidence, but he insists, nevertheless, that it is *aliqua vel minima notitia communis*, and is apparently content with this, sparing himself the trouble of further investigation.

There were Englishmen in the seventeenth century, men of the Cambridge school, who, like Herbert, clung to innate ideas but did not in the same manner found morality and religion upon the basis of natural religion. They took their stand upon revealed religion, seeking to prove that its truths were but the fulfillment of that which is foreshadowed by natural religion. Again we are reminded of our ancient apolo-

gists and neoplatonists. Indeed, in this case the likeness is closer. This new school of "latitudinarians," as they were called by their contemporaries, tried to bring the Church back to "her old loving nurse, the Platonic philosophy." Of this group was Ralph Cudworth, and more especially, Henry More. The latter revived the whole Platonic realm of ideas. The nature of the soul, its preëxistence and, as a matter of course, its immortality, are favorite subjects for his theosophical imagination. We are not surprised to find him clothing his fantastic conceptions in poetic garb. One of his early poems begins thus:

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For I would sing the pre-existency
 Of human souls, and live once more again
 By recollection and quick memory
 All what is past since first we all began.
 But all too shallow be my wits to scan
 So deep a point, and mind too dull to clear
 So dark a matter. But thou, O more than man,

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Aread, thou sacred soul of Plotin deare,
Tell what we mortalls are, tell what of old we were.

Much of his "Essay on Immortality" might have been written in verse, to such heights is his speculation raised by his fancy: "There are few that arrive at once at the celestial or ethereal vehicle, immediately upon their quitting the terrestrial one, that heavenly chariot necessarily carrying us in triumph to the greatest happiness the soul of man is capable of — which would happen to all men indifferently, good or bad, if the parting with this earthly body would suddenly mount us into the heavenly. Wherefore, by a just nemesis, the souls of men that are not very heroically virtuous will find themselves restrained within the compass of this caliginous air, as both reason itself will suggest and the Platonists have unanimously declared." Such proof in hand, we need not look for further particulars, but

must acknowledge that More, however versed he may have been in Cartesian philosophy and whatever stimulating things he may have said against the materialism of Hobbes, is not a true interpreter of the modern spirit. Tulloch, speaking of More's theory of the descent of heavy bodies to earth, wittily remarks, "The law of gravity, it is to be remembered, was not yet discovered." I, for one, must doubt whether More would have been more deeply impressed by Newton's discovery than he was by physical science in general, as it was known in his day.

Looking through the innumerable treatises of the English deists of the seventeenth century, as, for example, those of Blount and Tindal, we find them not much concerned with our problem. They were busy clearing away the obstacles put in the way of a rationalized Christianity by scripture tales

and churchly dogma. Their intellect, though perhaps not narrow, was hardly capable of systematic weighing of our question. We may pass them by without comment, and likewise their opponents in the literature of the controversy. As to the question of immortality, they would probably both have answered it in the affirmative, regarding future reward and punishment as essential factors of religion and morality.

Now it is just this traditional conception which later aroused the indignation of the Earl of Shaftesbury. It is strange that this man of genius — for such he was — has been so largely neglected by his countrymen. It is Dr. Benjamin Rand of Harvard University who has just recently drawn attention again to Shaftesbury. To Germans his name is familiar. We gratefully acknowledge the inspiring impulse which he gave to German thought

in its creative stage. To a large extent, this influence upon Germany was due to that very trait of individualism which alienated his countrymen. Shaftesbury is commonly called a moral philosopher. He himself preferred to be called a theologian, — a theologian, it must be said by way of oxymoron, without theology. There were those who would have added, “and without religion, as well.” Bishop Berkeley, for instance, severely reprimanded Shaftesbury for teaching a religion without heaven and hell. To the good bishop, religion and morality from which the hope of heavenly life and the fear of hell fire were eliminated were horrible things. To suppress these, he called upon “the magistrates and men in authority.” Shaftesbury, on the other hand, in the very name of religion and morality demanded that all thought of the future life, as a motive for religious and moral living, should be

eliminated. In this respect, he might have sided with the earlier spiritual leaders to whom I just alluded. In other respects, he is of quite a different type from those champions of mystical inwardness. In combating the notion of the future life and a world to come as a sign of superstitious enthusiasm, Shaftesbury is contending for a new ideal of humanity. This consists in our mastering the dark powers within ourselves which, in the shape of rude passions, of fanaticisms, of dismal religiosity, of spiritual and social bondage, weigh down mankind. Life is worth living for those only who by a sort of heroic effort free themselves from that which means inward death. Such a life is immortality in itself. They who lead it have need of no other. It may be said that this conception of immortality is the true Copernican conception. Shaftesbury was the first, Bruno excepted, to feel in all its strength the

revolutionizing influence of the Copernican views upon religion.

Turning to the philosophers of the eighteenth century, we find among "Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects" by David Hume, a few pages on the immortality of the soul. These pages are not found in older editions, the author himself having withdrawn the treatise from publication after it was already in print. He feared the censure which seemed to him inevitable. In this essay, which does credit to the acuteness of his logic, Hume seeks to refute all rational arguments in favor of immortality which are drawn "either from metaphysical topics or moral or physical." He then puts the essence of his own skeptical position in these words: "All doctrines are to be suspected which are favored by our passions. The hopes and fears which give rise to this doctrine, that, namely, of immortality, are

very obvious." Continuing, he says: "It is an infinite advantage in every controversy to defend the negative . . . By what arguments or analogies can we prove any state of existence which no one ever saw and which in no way resembles any that ever was seen? . . . Some new species of logic is required for that purpose, some new faculties of the mind which might enable us to comprehend that logic." He feels himself justified in asserting that "by the mere light of reason it seems difficult [he might have said impossible] to prove the immortality of the soul." In view of the collapse of rational argument, he then takes refuge in revelation, and by what seems to me little short of a *volte-face* he declares: "But in reality it is the gospel, and the gospel alone, that has brought life and immortality to light. . . . Nothing could set in fuller light the infinite obligations which man-

kind have to divine revelation, since we find that no other medium could ascertain this great and important truth." Such an attitude, even if supported by logic, would be tolerable only in a true believer in the doctrine of immortality. In a man of Hume's well-known skeptical views, it seems unnecessary. He reminds us of Pomponazzi, who submitted his views to the judgment of the Holy See, while yet the Holy See was but a nullity in his inward thought. For my part, I greatly prefer the candor of Shaftesbury.

Thus far I have been considering the line of English thought. I must now remind you of a solitary thinker in the Netherlands, Baruch Spinoza, a man of retired life, wrapped in deep thoughts touching the finite and the infinite. The twenty-third paragraph, or, as he calls it, the twenty-third proposition, of the fifth book of his "Ethics," deals with im-

mortality. It should be read in connection with the subsequent propositions, which lead us, with increasing elevation, to the clear heights of the intellectual love of God, *amor dei intellectualis*. The passage reads thus: *Mens humana* [he does not say *anima*] *non potest cum corpore absolute destrui, sed ejus aliquid remanet, quod est aeternum*. "The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed. Something of it remains which is eternal." I cannot give his argument in detail, but I may quote these fine sentences: "The eyes of the soul, by which it sees and observes, are arguments in themselves. . . . By them we feel (*sentimus*) that our soul, inasmuch as it involves the essence of our bodily existence in the light of immortality (*sub specie aeternitatis*) is eternal, and its existence cannot be limited by time." Inasmuch as the soul contemplates itself and its body *sub aeternitatis specie*, it feels directly that

it is in God, being thought by God. The more the soul is bound up in the *amor dei intellectualis*, the more it feels its own eternity, not being mere imagination but active intellect. Needless to say, Spinoza does not connect his conception of the soul's immortality with anything like hope or fear of eternal reward or punishment. On the contrary, he utterly disapproves the *opinio communis*, the opinion of the mass of men, to whom the sense of duty and religion is only a burden laid on them as the indispensable condition of a future reward.

Shaftesbury might have read these and similar words with inward assent. Curiously, however, there is nothing either in his essays or in his letters to show that he had read a line of Spinoza's "Ethics." He nowhere mentions his name. Hume, also, although he speaks of Spinoza in disdainful terms, appears

never to have read his works. His knowledge of "the famous atheist," as he calls him, was in all probability derived from Bayle's "Dictionnaire," 1696. Bayle himself, a leader of French skeptical thought, does, to be sure, devote a long article to Spinoza. He gropes, however, in the dark or, to use a German phrase, he speaks of him as a blind man speaks of colors.

French philosophy as a whole has contributed nothing of value to the solution of our problem. The French intellect is by nature skeptical. The Frenchmen of the Enlightenment were as a rule tinged with cynicism, which is a state of mind least suited to deal properly with the problem of immortality. Considering the limitations of my time, I will therefore leave them out of my account — skeptics, cynics, and, above all, those materialists by whose "deathlike greyness," to use Goethe's

words, the young German "Stürmer und Dränger," men of storm and stress, were repelled as by Cimmerian darkness.

Turning to German thinkers, I will not trouble you with a long series of names. I was myself astonished in preparing this lecture to discover so many treatises on "The Immortality of the Soul," on "The Arguments for Immortality," and like topics. Most of them are mere rubbish, "dryasdust," as Carlyle might have said. They give the impression that every man who was haunted by the problem felt constrained to unburden his mind. They must have had their public, however, else their works would not have been printed. Yet there is at least one among these treatises which deserves closer attention. This is Moses Mendelssohn's "Phaëdon, oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele." Mendelssohn, the grandfather of the composer Felix Men-

delssohn-Bartholdy, was one of the "Populär-Philosophen," as we call them in Germany, one of those literary men who sought to popularize the ideas of philosophy properly so called. Many of these men did only superficial work. Mendelssohn was not of this stamp. The friend of Lessing, Kant at one time held the opinion of him that he was destined to pave the way for a new conception of metaphysics. He was a man of much earnestness, of keen intellect and deep feeling. Imitating Plato, he clothed his argument in the form of a dialogue between Socrates and his disciples. In reading this treatise, one finds perhaps nothing essentially new. It contains little more than the arguments which Hume in his unpublished essay had definitively criticized some years before. Yet it reads well and must have been impressive in its day. Reading it nowadays, one feels some-

what uneasy, for behind Mendelssohn looms the figure of Kant, boding ill to those who would indulge in "metaphysical dreams."

Kant once said that it was Hume who roused him from dogmatic slumber. If he had read the "Treatise on Immortality," he would have been strengthened in this conviction. He would never have accepted the disingenuous admission of revelation by which Hume sought to hide his skepticism. Kant sided with the English philosopher in definitely rejecting any dogmatism whatsoever. He parted company with him in dealing with the three fundamental ideas of rational faith, namely, God, Freedom (or Virtue) and Immortality. These ideas, he says, are to be considered neither as the deposit of dogmatism nor as the product of metaphysical fancy, but as regulative principles, indispensable in themselves, practical postulates,

transcendental truths. They are not confined by time and space. They are beyond the scope of theoretical and empirical argument, that is, they are outside the province of reason. Kant emphasizes the hypothetical character of these practical postulates. He lays stress upon his transcendental philosophy as a means of lightening the burden laid upon humanity through its being bound in time and space. In this he is like Copernicus, who never thought of his geocentric theory except as a possible means of simplifying the understanding of the movements of the spheres, and who would probably be the first to welcome the theory of relativity, were he to visit earth again, as Chidher, the prophet of Islam, is said to do once in five hundred years. Kant's three rational principles had been the substance of rational theology since the day of the ancient apologists. Before

him, however, they had always been tinged with Ptolemaism. With all due deference to the genius of Kant, when I ponder upon the transcendental nature of his triad, I am reminded of the famous sentence in which Gibbon characterized the formula of the Council of Chalcedon,— I alter it slightly for my purpose,— “An invisible line was drawn between dogmatism and metaphysic, and the road to transcendentalism, a bridge as sharp as a razor, was suspended over the abyss by the master hand of the philosophical artist.”

It is obvious that immortality, when seen in the light of pure reason, is simply an allegory, the notion of time, as Kant has shown, being indissolubly bound up with the human organism. To realize the moral ideal is the supreme demand of Kant's practical philosophy. Since this ideal cannot be realized in finite time, in view of the limitations which

are connected with the human organism, it is of decisive import that this goal of our striving after holiness be not altogether unattainable. Were it otherwise, we must either set a limit to the demands of morality and become indolent, or, in our enthusiasm, we might ask too much of our ability to comply with those demands, and so lose ourselves "in philosophical dreams." Therefore the postulate of eternal life for the individual is "of the greatest utility," to use Kant's own phrase. Goethe has moulded his argument into these verses :

Du hast Unsterblichkeit im Sinn:
Kannst du uns deine Gründe nennen?
Nun wohl! Der Hauptgrund liegt darin,
Dass wir sie nicht entbehren können.

In later years, conversing with Eckermann, Goethe put new force into this thought when he said : "The conviction of the continuity of our existence arises, for me, out of the idea of activity. If,

to my last moment, I am unresting in activity, then Nature is bound to assign me another form of existence when my spirit can no longer endure this one." In my opinion, this is the form in which the argument comes nearest to the truth.

Nevertheless, the question must be raised, and indeed was raised by the German idealists, whether the immortality of the individual is properly a matter of concern either to philosophy or to religion. It was the influence of Bruno, of Shaftesbury, and, somewhat later, of Spinoza, which suggested this doubt and eventually led to the elimination of the old apologetic scheme of reward and punishment. In the young Schleiermacher, these influences were united with that of religious enthusiasm, which he had imbibed during his stay with the Moravians at Barby and Niesky. It was this curious combination which produced the amazing out-

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burst of religious feeling which marks his "Reden über die Religion an die Gebildeten unter ihrer Verächtern." I do not share the opinion of those who find in these addresses only the pale ghost of a dead religion. Schleiermacher, like Shaftesbury and the earlier spiritual reformers of whom I have spoken, was seeking, not to overthrow religion but to give it a firm foundation in truth. In his eyes, the form in which most men conceive immortality is utterly irreligious, inasmuch as their desire for immortality rests upon their aversion to that which is the true end of religion. I would refer you to the second "Address on Religion," and especially the latter part of it. I can quote here only the famous closing sentences: "Consider how all that is in us strives to expand the sharply cut outlines of personality, to be lost in the infinite, so that, so far as possible, we may by con-

templating it, become one with the universe. There are those who recoil from the infinite, who like their confinement, who would not be anything else but themselves, who are extremely anxious as to their individuality. In longing for an immortality which is no immortality, and which in any case they cannot achieve, they lose that immortality which they might attain. They lose even the mortal life, by thoughts which distress and torture them in vain. . . . Immortality is not to be hoped for except as it is to us a problem which we have solved. To become one with the infinite in the midst of finiteness, and to be eternal at this very moment, that is the immortality of religion." These words, whatever you may think of them, mark the culminating point of all that has been said about the immortality of man by the men of the Enlightenment, and with them we may close that book.

In one of the sermons of John Everard, a religious enthusiast if ever there was one, occurs this parable: Suppose two drops of water reasoning together. One says to the other, "Whence are we? Canst thou conceive whence we come or to whom we belong, or whither we shall go? Something we are, but what will presently become of us, canst thou tell?" The other drop might answer, "Alas, poor fellow drop, be assured that we are nothing. The sun may arrive and draw us up and scatter us, and so bring us to nothing." The other replies, "Suppose it should be so, for all that, yet we are, we have being, we are something. Why, brother drop, dost thou not know? We, even we, so small and contemptible as in ourselves we are, yet are part of the sea. Poor drops though we be, let us not be discouraged. We belong to the vast ocean."

And what about revelation? Once

more I call Schleiermacher to witness. Standing at the bier of his only son, he took comfort for himself and other mourners in these touching words: "Many seek consolation in visions of perpetual sojourn with the beloved dead. To the man for whom it is second nature to think in exact and inexorable logic, these visions bring a host of unanswered questions in their train. I would fain wrap myself in lonely comfort with the modest words of the Bible, which are yet of much promise: 'It doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is' (I John 3: 2)."

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